Use of unpublished procedure in federal courts


I sued the City of Steamboat Springs Colorado, its former president of city council Kevin Bennett, and various associated parties under 42U.S.C.§1983 in federal court District of Colorado 02-cv-1950. This and related complaints based on follow up events involving the same parties and the federal government are the only time I have sued anyone. My case was assigned to former federal judge Edward “Naughty” Nottingham.
see http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4452917&page=1
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/10/21/federal-judge-edward-nottingham-resigns-amid-misconduct-allegations/
http://www.denverpost.com/popular/ci_19281382?source=pop_neighbors_boulder
http://www.9news.com/news/story.aspx?storyid=87702
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/28230743/detail.html
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4465990&page=1#.
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/facing_new_ethics_complaint_by_ex_prostitute_us_judge_may_resign/
http://coloradoindependent.com/19910/watchdog-group-names-colorados-top-10-public-ethical-scandals-of-2008

When there isn’t a trial or a settlement, the only way that attorney fees can be awarded is under Rule 11. Judge Nottingham didn’t hold a trial and he didn’t write an opinion. There was a magistrate’s report but I timely objected to it and he didn’t state why he adopted it nor did he acknowledge my objection (document 222). Instead he just dismissed it with prejudice (document 455). Nottingham’s entire fee shifting order was
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“This matter has come to the attention of the court on docket #755, a motion filed by some of the Defendants for fees and costs incurred from May 1, 2004 through the date the motion was filed, December 30, 2005. To decide the motion the court has reviewed various pleadings and orders entered in this case, commencing with this court’s order of March 19, 2004, which accepted a thorough recommendation of the assigned magistrate judge, dismissed the case, and awarded Defendants attorney fees and costs incurred from January 30, 2003 forward. This review has disclosed a number of important matters which have been overlooked in the welter of filings with which Ms. Kay Sieverding has relentlessly peppered the court and Defendants’ counsel. The court will now attempt to address these matters and get the case back on track for further proceedings in this court and/or the court of appeals.
The court’s order of March 19, 2004, as noted, required Plaintiffs Kay and David Sieverding to pay attorney fees and costs incurred by all Defendants from January 30, 2003 forward. The order went on to recommit the litigation to the magistrate judge “for consideration of the attorney fees and costs to be awarded and a recommendation concerning those fees and costs.” (Emphasis supplied.) On March 24, 2004, the clerk entered Final Judgment on the March 19 order. This judgment was final and appealable, even though the matter of attorney fees remained pending in this court. See, e.g., Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins.Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 987 F.2d 1516, 1518 (10th Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs did appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed this court’s judgment on April 22, 2005.
Meanwhile, the litigation concerning attorney fees proceeded before the magistrate judge. On May 14, 2004, the magistrate judge issued an order awarding fees and costs to Defendants, notwithstanding that this court had mandated a recommendation in its March 19 order. The court believed — and continues to believe — that a magistrate judge does not have authority to enter a final order or judgment concerning attorney fees, but only to make a recommendation. E.g., Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 47 F.3d 922, 923–24 (7th Cir. 1995); Estate of Conners by Meredith v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658–59 (9th Cir.1993); cf. Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen Constr. Co., 879 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir.1989) (stating that a magistrate assigned additional duties under § 636[b][3] “remains constantly subject to the inherent supervisory power of the district judge”). Thus, the overlooked or unresolved matter which the court must address is the magistrate judge’s ruling of May 14, 2004 concerning attorney fees. Because the ruling involved a final disposition of the questions concerning attorney fees, the court will treat it as a recommendation.
On June 3, 2004, Plaintiffs filed objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The court must review the objections under the de novo standard of review. The court has done so. The objections are, characteristically, rambling, prolix, and sometimes incomprehensible.
They are organized under eighteen main sections headed by capital letters, many of which contain myriad sub-sections. The court will refer to the lettered sections in this ruling.
Plaintiffs mistakenly take the position that, since they appealed the judgment of dismissal, this court lacked jurisdiction to consider attorney fees (Sections A, B, C). This is wrong as a matter of law. See Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins.Co. V. City of Pittsburg, supra, 987 F.2d at 1518. Even if it were right, the Tenth Circuit has affirmed the dismissal and issued its mandate. This court has thus re-acquired jurisdiction.
For the most part, Plaintiffs’objections are an attempt to reargue the merits of the dismissal or to assert that they should have prevailed in their appeal (Sections D, E, G) or are without merit as a matter of fact and law (Sections F, H, J [in part] K, M, N, O, P, Q, and R). There is only one issue on which the court agrees with Plaintiffs. In section J, they argue that the magistrate judge mistakenly awarded $10,000 in fees to the American Bar Association. The court has searched for documentation supporting this award but has located none. The notation in the recommendation is that the award is “per order of court.” Except for the recommendation itself, however, the court has not been able to locate an order which would support the award. This aspect of the award, then, must be rejected. Otherwise, the court will accept the recommendation.
The court now turns to the motion which precipitated this review of the record — the request of some Defendants for fees and costs incurred after the date of the magistrate judge’s recommendation, May 14, 2004. Some of these fees are ripe for determination — for example, the fees incurred in defending against the frivolous appeal of this court’s dismissal of the case. Other parts are not so ripe — for example, the fees incurred in pursuing remedies against Kay and David Sieverding for contempt of court. Kay Sieverding has appealed this court’s finding of contempt and the matter is before the Tenth Circuit. She has also appealed the magistrate judge’s “ruling”on attorney fees, even though it now appears that the ruling was not final and that no judgment for fees has heretofore been entered. These issues, too, are before the Tenth Circuit. The appellate court may issue a ruling which would call into question the entitlement to fees. In any event, the court’s ruling on the appeal will likely generate still another supplemental request for fees. In these circumstances, this court exercises its discretion to postpone resolution of the motion at issue until the appellate court resolves any appeal, so that all fee questions can be addressed in a single proceeding.
In accordance with the foregoing findings and conclusions, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. The magistrate judge’s ruling/recommendation concerning fees, filed May 14, 2004
(#487) is ACCEPTED in part and REJECTED in part. It is rejected insofar as it recommends an award in favor of the American Bar Association in the amount of $10,000. It is accepted in all other respects.
2. The clerk shall forthwith enter a Final Judgment Concerning Attorney Fees in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs Kay and David Sieverding in the total amount of $101,864.82, allocated as follows: Hall & Evans $21,547.61; Lettunich & Vanderblemen $11,196.00; McConnell Siderius $35,857.00; Feldman, Nagel & Oliphant $8,900.00; Faegre & Benson $12,368.00;White & Steele $11,996.21.
3. The motion for supplemental attorney fees (#755) is DENIED without prejudice to renewal at a later point in these proceedings, after the Tenth Circuit has ruled on the issues before it.
4. The following Kay Sieverding motions are DENIED as frivolous: ##893, 896, 897, 899, 900, 902, 904, and 905.
Dated this 27th day of September, 2006. BY THE COURT:
s/ Edward W. Nottingham EDWARD W. NOTTINGHAM United States District Judge”
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As you can read, Judge Nottingham did not say what I wrote that was wrong, why my case was dismissed or his authority to award attorney fees.
I appealed this award multiple times to the 10th Circuit, each time paying $450. The first time they wrote:
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“Kay and David Sieverding appeal from the district court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees in favor of defendants and against them in the amount of $101,864.82. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
The parties are intimately familiar with the factual and procedural background of this appeal so our background discussion will be abbreviated. This appeal stems from a complaint the Sieverdings filed against defendants in 2002. In October 2003, the magistrate judge entered a recommendation that plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed, that they be ordered to pay attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction for violating Rule 11, and that filing restrictions be entered against them. In March 2004, the district court entered an order adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation in all respects. The district court then recommitted the matter to the magistrate judge to determine the amount of the attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to defendants.
The Sieverdings filed three appeals from the district court’s March 2004 order, which were consolidated. This court affirmed the district court’s order in April 2005. See Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 126 F. App’x 457, 459 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (Sieverding I). While the appeal was pending, the magistrate judge ordered supplemental briefing from the parties on the amount of the attorney’s fees and costs. The magistrate judge then entered an order in May 2004 awarding specific amounts of fees and costs to the individual defendants. In June 2004, the Sieverdings filed objections to the magistrate judge’s order. In September 2006, the district court construed the magistrate judge’s May 2004 order as a recommendation and accepted it in part and rejected it in part. The district court then entered a final judgment awarding specific amounts of attorney’s fees and costs to the individual defendants. The Sieverdings now appeal from this judgment. Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. We deny this motion because this appeal is ripe for a decision on the merits.
Appellees argue that our decision in Sieverding I previously determined the Sieverding’s liability for fees and costs. Although we did affirm the district court’s judgment in Sieverding I, we made no express determination as to the Sieverding’s liability for fees and costs. Any implied decision on the attorney’s fee issue in Sieverding I would not be binding on this panel because this court lacked jurisdiction to review the attorney’s fee determination at that time because the award had not yet been reduced to a sum certain. See Am. Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., 428 F.3d 921, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2005).
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to impose Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees and costs. See White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir. 1990). The Sieverdings have not presented any reasoned argument demonstrating that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees and costs as a Rule 11 sanction.
Rule 11 provides, in relevant part, that anyone who signs a pleading or other paper certifies “that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” the claims therein are: (1) warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for new or modified law; and (2) supported by evidence or likely to be supported by evidence after discovery and investigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Parties who file lawsuits on a pro se basis must comply with the provisions of Rule 11. Id.
In the magistrate judge’s initial October 2003 recommendation regarding the attorney’s fee issue, he explained that he had entered an order on January 10, 2003, setting the case for a status conference and notifying the Sieverdings that their claims “appear[ed] to be completely groundless and frivolous, in violation of [Rule 11].” Aplee. App., Vol. III at 344 (quotation omitted). The magistrate judge noted that the January 10 order also informed plaintiffs that his purposes in setting the status conference were two-fold: (1) to discuss with plaintiffs [his] concerns that their claims were groundless, and (2) to attempt to persuade plaintiffs to reconsider their claims in light of the probability that they will be sanctioned and/or ordered to pay legal fees to the defendants who are the subjects of frivolous claims. Id. (quotation omitted). At the January 30 status conference, the magistrate judge “attempted again to impress upon plaintiffs that their claims were groundless and frivolous” and “urged them, again, to reconsider most, if not all, of their claims in light of the remarks made by [him], and by the attorneys who addressed the court with comments about the groundless nature of the claims against their respective clients.” Id. at 345.
The magistrate judge then continued his recommendation by detailing the Rule 11 violations in the Sieverdings’ complaint and explained again how they had been repeatedly advised and warned by the court and other lawyers that their claims were baseless and frivolous. Id. at 389-91. The magistrate judge explained that his January 10 order and the January 30 status conference “stood as clear notice to plaintiffs of the probability that sanctions would be imposed against them if they failed or refused to withdraw the claims that the court or counsel indicated were frivolous or groundless.” Id. at 397. The magistrate judge also discussed the Sieverdings’ abusive litigation tactics and the need for compensation to be paid to the defendants who were the victims of this abuse. Id. at 393-94.
As noted above, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and then recommitted the matter to the magistrate judge to resolve the amount of the sanction. In a thorough and well-reasoned seventeen-page order, the magistrate judge applied the factors identified in our case law for determining the amount of Rule 11 sanctions. See Aplee. App., Vol. IV at 635-651. The district court reviewed de novo the Sieverdings’ objections to the magistrate judge’s order and accepted the recommendation, with the exception of one portion of the award for fees to the American Bar Association, which it rejected.
The Sieverdings fail to present any argument regarding the reasonableness of the amount of the award. Because of this, the Sieverdings have waived any challenge to the reasonableness of the award. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that failure to raise issue in an opening appellate brief waives issue on appeal).
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s October 14, 2003 recommendation and May 14, 2004 order, as adopted by the district court in its March 19, 2004 and September 27, 2006 orders, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment awarding fees in the amount of $101,864.82 in favor of defendants and against the Sieverdings. We DENY all outstanding motions.”
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As you can read, the 10th Circuit also did not state what it was that we filed that was incorrect.
The second time the 10th Circuit wrote
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“Kay and David Sieverding, appearing pro se, appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). We affirm.
Background The parties are familiar with the lengthy history of this case. The relevant facts relating to this appeal are set forth in this court’s decision in Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Association, 237 F. App’x 355, 357-359 (10th Cir. 2007). In that decision, filed on June 14, 2007, this court affirmed the district court’s judgment awarding attorney fees in favor of defendants in the amount of $101,864.82. The attorney fees were awarded as a Rule 11 sanction for the Sieverdings’ frivolous and abusive litigation. On June 20, 2008, the Sieverdings filed a Rule 60(b)(4) motion in district court, which sought to void the judgment awarding attorney fees in favor of defendants. The district court denied the motion. The Sieverdings now appeal from that order.
Discussion We review de novo the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. See Amoco Oil Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 231 F.3d 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that Rule 60(b)(4) denials are reviewed de novo unlike other Rule 60(b) motions, which are reviewed for abuse of discretion).
The Sieverdings first complain that the district court abused its discretion by denying their Rule 60(b)(4) motion without giving any reasons for the denial. In support of their position, they rely on Gladwell v. Scofield, 222 F. App’x 750 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 448 (2007). In Gladwell, an unpublished, non-binding decision, this court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give the reasons for its denial of a Rule 60(b) motion. Id. at 752-53. But in that case, this court was reviewing the denial of a general Rule 60(b) motion, not a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. Moreover, in Gladwell, this court was reviewing the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. Id. at 752. As noted above, the abuse of discretion standard is not applicable to a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. See Amoco, 231 F.3d at 697. Because we are reviewing the Rule 60(b)(4) motion de novo, it does not matter that the district court did not give the reasons for its denial.
As for the merits of their Rule 60(b)(4) motion, the Sieverdings argue that the judgment awarding attorney fees is void because the district court failed to follow Rules 11 and 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Sieverdings assert also that they “were not told the basis for the sanctions.” R., Vol. I, Doc. 1069. A party may seek relief under Rule 60(b)(4) if “the judgment is void.” “A judgment is void only if the court which rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1344 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). The Sieverdings did not present any argument in their Rule 60(b)(4) motion that shows they can meet this standard. Finally, the Sieverdings’ statement that they did not know the basis for these sanctions is an outright misrepresentation of the facts of this case. As this court detailed in the order and judgment affirming the award of attorney fees, the magistrate judge issued an order in January 2003 putting the Sieverdings on notice that their claims appeared to be groundless and frivolous in violation of Rule 11 and that they could be subject to sanctions in the form of paying for the defendants’ legal fees. See Sieverding, 237 F. App’x at 358-59. At the status conference later that month, the magistrate judge “attempted again to impress upon plaintiffs that their claims were groundless and frivolous.” Id. (quotation omitted). In his sixty-page report recommending that the Sieverdings’ claims be dismissed and that they be sanctioned, the magistrate judge detailed the Sieverdings’ Rule 11 violations and how they had been repeatedly warned and advised that their claims were frivolous and baseless. Id. at 359. The Sieverdings filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court considered the objections and then adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the Sieverdings be sanctioned. Id. The Sieverdings received ample notice of the basis for these sanctions and had the opportunity to object before these sanctions were imposed.
Conclusion This appeal is frivolous and represents another example of the Sieverdings’abusive litigation practices. Including this appeal, the Sieverdings have filed eleven appeals and two requests for mandamus relief arising out of this district court case. There is nothing left to be reviewed from this district court case. We caution the Sieverdings that if they file another appeal or special proceeding arising out of this district court case then we will seek to impose sanctions against them in the form of appellate filing restrictions. See Winslow v. Hunter (In re Winslow), 17 F.3d 314, 315-16 (10th Cir. 1994) (imposing filing restrictions on plaintiffs with a history of abusive and repetitive filings in this court).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Sieverdings’ motion to supplement the record and to remand for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.”
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As you can see again the 10th Circuit did not state why our lawsuit was frivolous or in bad faith, only that the magistrate had stated that he thought that it was.
In 2011, we paid $450 to appeal the attorney fee award, the 10th Circuit ruled, but did not publish on its website:
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“David and Kay Sieverding have filed a petition for writ of prohibition asking us to vacate the district court’s March 2004 order directing petitioners to pay the several defendants’ attorney fees as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in case No. 02-CV-1950 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Petitioners contend the district court’s order is void.
“The standards for reviewing petitions for writs of prohibition are similar to the standards for reviewing petitions for writs of mandamus.” In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 2004). Like a writ of mandamus, a writ of prohibition may not be used as a substitute for appeal, and a party must show that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable. Sangre de Cristo Cmty. Mental Health Serv., Inc. v. United States (In re Vargas), 723 F.2d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir. 1983).
Petitioners contend the district court failed to “explain the basis for the sanction” as required by Rule 11(c)(6), so the sanctions were not proper under Rule 11. Because the sanctions were improper under Rule 11, petitioners reason, they could have been imposed only under the court’s inherent power, but the district court did not give them advance notice that it might impose sanctions under its inherent powers, so the order imposing sanctions is void.
Petitioners’ arguments are frivolous. This court has twice upheld the district court’s order awarding attorney fees in favor of the defendants in the underlying litigation as a sanction against petitioners. In Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Association, 237 F. App’x 355, 359 (10th Cir. 2007), we upheld the district court’s imposition of sanctions under Rule 11. And in Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Association, 310 F. App’x 229, 232 (10th Cir. 2009), we specifically rejected petitioners’ argument that they did not know the basis for the imposition of sanctions, calling their argument “an outright misrepresentation of the facts of this case” and detailing the extensive notice given petitioners.
The petition for writ of prohibition is dismissed as frivolous.” (see 11-1127)
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As you can see once again the 10th Circuit didn’t say what we had written that deserved to be sanctioned or why.
We then filed paid another $450 to file a petition for mandamus claiming that we shouldn’t be sanctioned because the Rules Enabling Act requires that all rules be published and there is no published rule that allows federal courts to award attorney fees without stating why they are awarded, even if a magistrate recommends them. See 28 USC § 2071 http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/Legislation/RulesEnablingAct.aspx
In response the 10th Circuit ordered, see 11-cv-1257 (this is not on their website)
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“This matter comes before the court on the petition for writ of mandamus or, alternatively, writ of prohibition filed by Kay and David Sieverding. The Sieverdings seek mandamus relief with respect to three rulings of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in case No. 1:02-CV-01950:
(1) the district court’s dismissal of their complaint with prejudice; (2) its imposition of attorney fees and costs as a sanction under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) its imposition of filing restrictions. The Sieverdings have previously challenged each of these rulings on appeal. See Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 126 F. App’x 457, 459 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding dismissal of complaint with prejudice); Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding imposition of filing restrictions as modified to narrow scope); Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 237 F. App’x 355, 358-59 (10th Cir. 2007) (upholding award of attorney fees and costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 310 F. App’x 229, 231-32 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion challenging award of attorney fees and costs). And only a few weeks ago, the Sieverdings filed a petition for writ of prohibition challenging the district court’s imposition of attorney fees and costs on a ground similar to that raised here; we dismissed the petition as frivolous.
“[M]andamus is not a substitute for an appeal”; it is “a drastic remedy, and is to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances.” In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To obtain mandamus relief, the Sieverdings must show they have no other avenue for relief and their right to the writ is clear and indisputable. Id. at 1187. We in turn, must conclude in the exercise of our discretion that mandamus relief is warranted under the circumstances. Id.
The Sieverdings utterly fail to meet the standard for mandamus relief. Their mandamus petition is frivolous and should be dismissed. The petition is also another example of the Seiverdings’ continued frivolous and abusive filings in this court. In 2009, we told the Sieverdings “[t]here is nothing left to be reviewed from this district court case,” and we warned them that “if they file another appeal or special proceeding arising out of this district court case then we will seek to impose sanctions against them in the form of appellate filing restrictions.” Sieverding, 310 F. App’x at 232 (citing Winslow v. Hunter (In re Winslow), 17 F.3d 314, 315-16 (10th Cir. 1994)). It is time to put our warning into effect.
“Federal courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.” Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007). One or both of the Sieverdings have filed ten appeals, numerous requests for mandamus relief, and countless motions arising out of a single District of Colorado case.1 The Sieverdings were denied relief in all but appeal No. 06-1038, where they obtained partial relief when this court narrowed the scope of the district court’s filing restrictions, which it otherwise affirmed. Many of their filings not only lacked merit, but were frivolous and abusive.
Accordingly, subject to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Tenth Circuit Rule 35.1, we will not accept any further filings, including appeals and original proceedings, from Kay or David Sieverding related to District of Colorado case No. 1:02-CV-01950 or its subject matter, unless the filings arise out of criminal contempt proceedings. The Clerk of this court shall return any prohibited filings, unfiled, to Kay or David Sieverding.
Kay and David Sieverding shall have ten days from the date of this order to file written objections, limited to fifteen pages, to these proposed sanctions. See Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1078. If neither Kay nor David Sieverding files an objection, the sanctions shall take effect twenty days from the date of this order. If either Kay or David Sieverding does file a timely objection, these sanctions shall not take effect as to the objecting party until after this court has ruled on the objection; the filing restrictions shall apply to any matter filed after that time.
The petition for a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED as frivolous. Except as noted herein, Kay and David Sieverding are ENJOINED from additional filings, including appeals and original proceedings, relating to District of Colorado case No. 1:02-CV-01950 or its subject matter, unless the filings arise out of criminal contempt proceedings.”
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Again you see the 10th Circuit failed to state what we wrote that was wrong. Within the 10 days allowed we did file objections. The 10th Circuit ruled (see Appellate Case: 11-1227 Document: 01018681756 Date Filed: 07/25/2011)
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“By order entered June 16, 2011, in No. 11-1257, we directed petitioners to show cause within ten days why this court should not impose filing restrictions on them. Rather than respond directly to the show cause order, petitioners filed a petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc in No. 11-1227 and No. 11-1257.
In their rehearing petition, petitioners maintain the respective district court orders they challenged in these two original proceedings were in error. They also contend the filing restrictions this court proposed in No. 11-1257 fail to comply with the provision in Rule 65(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that “[e]very order granting an injunction and every restraining order must . . .describe in reasonable detail–and not by referring to the complaint or other document–the act or acts restrained or required.” Notably, petitioners do not challenge this court’s conclusion that petitioners’ past conduct warrants the imposition of filing restrictions.
The panel has reviewed the rehearing petition and determined it raises no valid ground for rehearing the merits of either No. 11-1227 or No. 11-1257. The panel further concludes that the petition raises no valid challenge to the filing restrictions this court proposed in No. 11-1257. The restrictions are carefully tailored to curb petitioners’ specific abusive conduct, see Ysais v. Richardson, 603 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 163 (2010), and they are sufficiently detailed to provide petitioners notice of the conduct that is prohibited.
Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied. The petition for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all of the judges of the court who are in regular active service. As no member of the panel and no judge in regular active service on the court requested that the court be polled, that petition is also denied.
In addition, the following filing restrictions shall take effect immediately: Subject to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 35 and Tenth Circuit Rule 35.1, we will not accept any further filings, including appeals and original proceedings, from Kay or David Sieverding related to District of Colorado case No. 1:02-CV-01950 or its subject matter, unless the filings arise out of criminal contempt proceedings. The Clerk of this court shall return any prohibited filings, unfiled, to Kay or David Sieverding.”
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Again you see the 10th Circuit did not state the basis for the sanctions, i.e. what we wrote that was wrong, or the published rule or statute that allowed this action. We had quoted 28 USC § 2077 Publication of rules “(a) The rules for the conduct of the business of each court of appeals, including the operating procedures of such court, shall be published.” http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/Legislation/RulesEnablingAct.aspx
but the 10th Circuit ignored that.
When we originally appealed the dismissal (10th Circuit 04-1108) the 10th Circuit ruled:
“This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs-appellants, formerly residents of Steamboat Springs, Colorado, appeal from the dismissal of their suit, which purported to state claims against numerous defendants who allegedly violated appellants’ legal rights with regard to zoning decisions that affected appellants and their former neighbors. Although appellants filed three separate appeals, all of them challenge the same final judgment entered by the district court on March 19, 2004.
We have reviewed the voluminous district court record. In our view, the magistrate judge performed a Herculean feat in his sixty-one page recommendation filed on October 14, 2003. He made as much sense as possible of appellants’ numerous complaints and amended complaints, and cogently explained: (1) why they had no valid claim and their suit should be dismissed with prejudice; (2) why they should be required to pay defendants’ costs and fees since January 30, 2003; and (3) why they should be enjoined from commencing further litigation regarding these events without first obtaining counsel. The district court reviewed the record de novo, and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation in full.
Appellants’ “arguments” on appeal are incomprehensible. Based on our review of the district court record, we AFFIRM, as we find no fault with the magistrate judge’s analysis, as adopted by the district court. We observe that appellants did not assert error with the imposition of filing restrictions and, therefore, this court will enforce those restrictions.
Appellees’ motion to consolidate the appeals is granted. Appellants’ motion to file a substitute reply brief is denied. Appellants’ other outstanding motions–including appellants’ motion filed on April 13, 2005, asking this court to invite the Department of Justice to investigate the magistrate judge, the district court, and defense counsel–are denied as moot or as frivolous and meritless.”
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So that time the 10th Circuit also didn’t state what it was that we did wrong or why our case was dismissed.
The Supreme Court wrote in THOMAS v. ARN, 106 S. Ct. 466, 474 U.S. 140 (U.S. 12/04/1985)
“The Magistrate’s Act states that “any party may serve and file written objections to [the magistrate’s] proposed findings and recommendations. . . . A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U. S. C. ? 636(b)(1)(C). The Act clearly specifies the penalty for a party’s failure to file objections to the magistrate’s report — the party loses his right to de novo review by the district court. The Act does not require a party to file objections. And it does not, contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s rule, provide that a party’s failure to file objections deprives him of the right to any review by the district court,*fn* or by the court of appeals. Rather, the district court judge retains the power, and indeed the obligation, to “accept, reject, or modify” the magistrate’s findings and recommendations. 28 U. S. C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Act leaves unaffected a party’s right to appeal the judgment of the district court to the court of appeals.”
In our case, we filed a timely objection to the magistrate’s report and recommendation. It was document 222 and shows on PACER in the District of Colorado 02-cv-1950.
When Judge Nottingham dismissed our case he wrote:
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“ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RECOMMENDATION”
UNITED STATES COURT DISTRICT OF COLORADO 02-1950
KAY SIEVERDING; DAVID SIEVERDING, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION, and their in- surance company (true name unknown); CITY OF STEAMBOAT SPRINGS, CO, a municipality (hereinafter the CITY); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, and their insurance company (true name unknown); JANE BENNETT, private person acting in conspiracy with CITY policy makers; KEN BRENNER, individu- ally and in his capacity as a CITY Council Member; JAMES ENGLEKEN, individually and in his capacity as CITY Council Member; ART FIEBING, individu- ally and as employed as CITY assistant chief of po- lice; SANDY FIEBING, individually and as the CITY code enforcement officer; DANIEL FOOTE, Attorney, individually and in his capacity as Assistant CITY attorney; J. D. HAYS, individually and in capacity as CITY director of public safety; JAMES “SANDY” HORNER, individually and as an attorney work- ing for KLAUZER & TREMAINE and his insurance company; ANTHONY LETTUNICH, individually and in capacity as CITY attorney and his insurance; PAUL R. MCLIMANS, individually and in capacity as a district attorney and his insurance company; WENDIE SCHULENBURG, also known as Wendie Rooney, individually and in capacity as CITY planning services director; and her insurance; MELINDA SHERMAN, individually and former Assistant CITY attorney, and in capacity, and their insurance; KERRY ST. JAMES, individually and in capacity as deputy or assistant district attorney; and his insurance; ARI- ANTHE STETTNER, individually and in capacity as CITY council member; PAUL STRONG, individually and in capacity as CITY Council Member; and his in- surance company; RICHARD TREMAINE, individu- ally and in capacity as an attorney; and his insurance company; JAMES WEBER, individually and in capac- ity as CITY public works director; and his insurance company; P. ELIZABETH WITTEMYER, individually and in capacity as Deputy District attorney; and her insurance; JAMES B.F. OLIPHANT, Bennett’s attorney and purchaser of plaintiff ’s home; KEVIN BENNETT, individually and in capacity as CITY Council member; DAVID BROUGHAM, individually and in capacity as apparent CITY insurance agent (for CIRSA); KATHY CONNELL, individually and as employed as CITY Council Member; HALL & EVANS, LLC, and their insurance; KLAUZER & TREMAINE, a law firm, and insurance (true name unknown); RANDALL KLAU- ZER, individually and in capacity as an attorney and his insurance company; SUZANNE SCHLICHT, individually and in capacity as newspaper publisher and her insurance; STEAMBOAT PILOT & TODAY NEWSPAPER, (WORLDWEST LIMITED LIABILI- TY COMPANY) and insurance (true name unknown), Defendants-Appellees, and CHARLES LANCE, Attorney, individually and in capacity as former district attorney and his insurance; CIRSA, insurance for the CITY; INSURANCE AGENT, other than Brougham and decision makers for CIRSA (true name unknown); DAVIS, GRAHAM & STUBBS, LLC; JAMES GAR- RECHT, in capacity as district court judge; (for injunctive relief only since he is immune from suit for dam- ages); PAUL HUGHES, individually and in capacity as CITY manager, Defendants.
This matter is before the court on the “Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge” filed October 14, 2003. After an extensive, time-consuming analysis of the background and facts, the magistrate judge recommends that (1) the case be dismissed with prejudice 2) Plaintiff Kay Sieverding (and her husband) be required to pay all costs and attorney fees in- curred by all defendants since January 30, 2003, and (3) plaintiffs be enjoined from filing further lawsuits based on the series of transactions underlying their complaint, unless plaintiffs are represented by counsel in any such lawsuits. Plaintiffs have objected to the recommendation. The objections suffer from the same defects as plaintiffs’ other submissions. They are prolix, disorganized, incomprehensible and (to the extent that the court can discern any thread in the argument) legally twisted. I have conducted the requisite de novo of the issues, the record, and the recommendation. Based on this review, I have concluded that the recom- mendation is a correct application of the facts and the law. Accordingly, it is Ordered as follows: 1.) The recommendation (#188) is accepted and adopted as this court’s ruling on the case. All motions to dismiss are granted. 2.) Plaintiff’s myriad motions for sanctions are all denied. 3.) The case is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 4.) Plaintiff Kay Sieverding (and her husband) shall pay all attorney fees and costs incurred by all defendants since January 30, 2003. 5.) Plaintiffs are hereby enjoined and prohibited from commencing litigation in this or any other court based on the se- ries of transactions described in this case, unless they are represented by counsel. 6.) All other pending motions are denied as moot or meritless. 7.) The case is hereby recommitted to the assigned magistrate judge for consideration of the attorney fees and costs to be awarded and a recommendation concerning those fees and costs. Dated this 19th day of March, 2004. By the Court Edward W. Nottingham.”
As you can see Judge Nottingham failed to state why our complaint was not valid. Judge Nottingham did not comply with Rule 52 a which states see http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_52
RULE 52. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BY THE COURT; JUDGMENT ON PARTIAL FINDINGS
(a) Findings and Conclusions.
(1) In General. In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The findings and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the court.”
Since Judge Nottingham acknowledged that we had objected to the magistrate’s report, the 10th Circuit was also on notice that we had objected to the magistrate’s report.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 states
“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.”
(d) Other Powers to Grant Relief. This rule does not limit a court’s power to:
(1) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding;
(2) grant relief under 28 U.S.C. §1655 to a defendant who was not personally notified of the action; or
(3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”
I filed for relief from judgment in the District of Columbia. Reading this again I now realize that I specified Rule 60(b)(3) and maybe I should have specified Rule 60(d). I relied on a decision by the 5th Circuit ” Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F. 2d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1970), “procedural differences in the motion practice and the independent action, but these have not been found to raise due process considerations which would bar treating a Rule 60(b) motion as an independent action.”
Since I am not an attorney it has taken me a while to appreciate the Rules of Statutory Construction. But now I can’t go back to the District of Colorado because I am not allowed to file documents there, unless I find a lawyer who will do this for me.
So you see that the attorney fee award did not comply with Rule 52 nor with Rule 54, which states
RULE 54. JUDGMENT; COSTS
(a) Definition; Form. “Judgment” as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment should not include recitals of pleadings, a master’s report, or a record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.
(c) Demand for Judgment; Relief to Be Granted. A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings. Every other final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.
(d) Costs; Attorney’s Fees.
(1) Costs Other Than Attorney’s Fees. Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party. But costs against the United States, its officers, and its agencies may be imposed only to the extent allowed by law. The clerk may tax costs on 14 days’ notice. On motion served within the next 7 days, the court may review the clerk’s action.
(2) Attorney’s Fees.
(A) Claim to Be by Motion. A claim for attorney’s fees and related nontaxable expenses must be made by motion unless the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages.
(B) Timing and Contents of the Motion. Unless a statute or a court order provides otherwise, the motion must:
(i) be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment;
(ii) specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award;
(iii) state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it; and
(iv) disclose, if the court so orders, the terms of any agreement about fees for the services for which the claim is made.
(C) Proceedings. Subject to Rule 23(h), the court must, on a party’s request, give an opportunity for adversary submissions on the motion in accordance with Rule 43(c) or78. The court may decide issues of liability for fees before receiving submissions on the value of services. The court must find the facts and state its conclusions of law as provided in Rule 52(a).
(D) Special Procedures by Local Rule; Reference to a Master or a Magistrate Judge. By local rule, the court may establish special procedures to resolve fee-related issues without extensive evidentiary hearings. Also, the court may refer issues concerning the value of services to a special master under Rule 53 without regard to the limitations of Rule 53(a)(1), and may refer a motion for attorney’s fees to a magistrate judge under Rule 72(b) as if it were a dispositive pretrial matter.
(E) Exceptions. Subparagraphs (A)–(D) do not apply to claims for fees and expenses as sanctions for violating these rules or as sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §1927.
The docket entry for document 911 states:

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ORDER Accepting in part and Rejecting in part 487 Magistrate Judge’s Ruling/Recommendation concerning fees. Denying without prejudice 755 Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees; Clerk shall forthwith enter a Final Judgment Concerning Attorney Fees in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs Kay and David Sieverding in the total amount of $101,864.82, allocated as follows: Hall & Evans $21,547.61; Lettunich & Vanderblemen $11,196.00; McConnell Siderius $35,857.00; Feldman, Nagel & Oliphant $8,900.00; Faegre & Benson $12,368.00; White & Steele $11,996.21. Denying as Frivolous 893 Motion for judicial notice; Denying as Frivolous 896 Motion for judicial notice that the Supreme Court of Cooke v United States; Denying as Frivolous 897 Motion to Stay Contempt of Court Proceedings; Denying as Frivolous 899 Motion for Extension of Time re: Hearing Scheduled for 9/22/06; Denying as Frivolous 900 Motion for Judicial notice dept of justice report on another fictious insurance company also selling malpractice insurance; Denying as Frivolous 902 Motion for judicial notice that Christopher Beall does not deny that he is employed by a RICO-Mutual Insurance of Bermuda; Denying as Frivolous 904 Motion for judicial notice that Faegre and Benson billed Mutual Insurance/Jerome Schaefer on 10/29/04 for conference; Denying as Frivolous 905 Motion for Discovery as to why Beall had an ex parte telephone conference with the 10th circuit clerk’s office re: Status of Case. Signed by Judge Edward W. Nottingham on 9/27/06.(pap, ) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
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The docket entry for the original dismissal of the case and award of attorney fee sanctions states

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ORDER by Judge Edward W. Nottingham accepting Magistrate’s recommendation [188-1]; granting dft’s motion to dismiss purs to FRCv12(b)(6) [130-1], granting dfts’ motion to dismiss all claims against newspaper dfts [120-1], granting dfts’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions [115- 1], granting dfts’ motion to dismiss and/or for sum jgm [106-1], granting dfts’ motion to dismiss [105-1], granting dfts’ motion to dismiss purs to FRCvP 12(b)(6), 8(a)(2) and 9(b) [104-1], granting dfts’ motion for sanctions purs to Rule 11 [97-1], granting dfts’ motion to dismiss purs to FRCvP 12(b)(6) [101-1], granting dft’s motion to dismiss purs to FRCvP 12(b)(6) [69-1], granting dfts’ motion for sanctions [67-1] dismissing case with prejudice ; plas Kay Sieverding and David Sieverding shall pay all attorney fees and costs incurred by dfts since 1/30/03; plas are enjoined and prohibited from commencing litigation in this or any other court based on the series of transactions described in this case, unless they are represented by counsel; all pending motions are denied as moot or meritless; (cc: all counsel) ; Case is recommitted to the assigned magistrate judge for consideration of the attorney fees and costs to be awarded and a recommendation concerning those fees and costs; entry date : 3/22/04 (pap) Modified on 03/22/2004 (Entered: 03/22/2004)
****************
so as you can see it refers to two Rule 11 motions but to no other motions for attorney fees. However, the orders do not comply with Rule 11(c)(6) which states “(6) Requirements for an Order. An order imposing a sanction must describe the sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction.”

The 10th Circuit stated that the Court imposed the sanctions against us on its own but the court didn’t comply with

“(5) Limitations on Monetary Sanctions. The court must not impose a monetary sanction:
(A) against a represented party for violating Rule 11(b)(2); or
(B) on its own, unless it issued the show-cause order under Rule 11(c)(3) before voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.”
because it didn’t issue a show cause order under Rule 11(c)(3).
When we filed our original complaint, we sent a copy to our former lawyer in Steamboat Springs, William Hibbard. His phone number is 970 879 4330. He wrote back
“Dear Kay, I am returning the check that you had sent. I have in no way asked for that. I did have a chance to read through the voluminous pleadings while I was up at the cabin. Interesting theories, especially against the ABA and the Colorado Bar Association. I am not sure how far those will go, but I would be interested in knowing. As a friend, keep me up to date of what is going on. As you know, I am not involved in the litigation of the case but I would certainly be willing to give you some comments”.
This is on PACER see District of Columbia Case 1:05-cv-01283-RMU Document 30 Filed 09/23/2005
I asked Judge Nottingham why he dismissed my case: Here is the transcript:
*********************
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 02CV1950-EWN KAY SIEVERDING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs. COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants. ___________________________________________________
REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT MOTION HEARING ___________________________________________________
Proceedings before the HONORABLE EDWARD W. NOTTINGHAM, Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, commencing at 9:36 a.m., on the 4th day of January, 2006, in Courtroom A1001, United States Courthouse, Denver, Colorado.
For the Plaintiffs
For the Defendants
APPEARANCES
KAY SIEVERDING, PRO SE MICHAEL O’MALLEY, ESQ. 1444 Stuart Street Denver, Colorado CHRISTOPHER P. BEALL, ESQ. Faegre & Benson
370 17th Street Denver, Colorado TRACI VAN PELT, ESQ. MICHAEL McCONNELL, ESQ. McConnell Siderius Fleischner 2401 15th Street
Denver, Colorado DAVID BROUGHAM, ESQ. Hall & Evans 1125 17th Street Denver, Colorado BRETT HUFF, ESQ. White & Steele 950 17th Street Denver, Colorado
THERESE LINDBLOM, Official Reporter 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado 80294 Proceedings Reported by Mechanical Stenography Transcription Produced via Computer
PROCEEDINGS THE COURT: Case No. 02-cv-1950, Sieverding and others v. Colorado Bar Association and others. I’ll take the appearances, starting with thedefendants.
MR. BEALL: Your Honor, Christopher Beall, Faegre &Benson, on behalf of the Steamboat Pilot and Suzanne Schlicht.
MS. VAN PELT: Good morning, Your Honor. Tracy Van Pelt and Mike McConnell here on behalf of Klauzer & Tremaine, Rich Tremaine, Randall Klauzer, James Horner and Jane Bennett.
THE COURT: Who are they, generally?
MS. VAN PELT: Jane Bennett was Ms. Sieverding’s neighbor, and those are the lawyers that represented Jane Bennett in the initial dispute.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. HUFF: Good morning. Brett Huff here on behalf of the CBA this morning.
MR. BROUGHAM: David Brougham on behalf of 25 or 30 Steamboat Springs officials.
THE COURT: All of the Government officials, essentially, right?
MR. BROUGHAM: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. And Ms. Sieverding appears.
MS. SIEVERDING: Yes, I’m Kay Sieverding. No, there weren’t 25 or 30 people. And Jane Bennett was the one who accused me of harassing her because I told her that she wasn’t entitled to break the law, the zoning law, because her husband was president of City Council. That wasn’t in the magistrate’s report, though.
MR. O’MALLEY: I’ve been hired by David Sieverding to represent him today, Mike O’Malley.
THE COURT: All right.
The matter is before the Court on Document No. 704, the motion to enter further relief or new contempt by Kay Sieverding, which was filed on behalf of the defendants that I’m going to call the press or newspaper defendants.
So I’ll hear that first of all. Now, I know that there are other motions that are pending, but I’ll deal with them later, because this was the impetus for originally setting the motions.
First of all, did Mr. Sieverding dismiss the cases as he promised at the hearing in September?
MR. BEALL: Your Honor, to address your first question. According to the Pacer docket report for one of three cases in the D.C. District Court, Mr. Sieverding filed a withdrawal in Case No. 05-cv-1283 — excuse me, let me see if I can find it — on September 8, 2005.
THE COURT: All right. Which judge has that been assigned to?
MR. BEALL: Judge Urbina, Ricardo M. Urbina.
THE COURT: What’s the status of the case at the moment?
MR. BEALL: That case continues, although Judge Urbina on December 22 granted a motion by various defendants in that case to stay their obligation to respond to the numerous motions filed by Mrs. Sieverding subsequent to their motion to dismiss. No ruling on the motion to dismiss has yet entered.
THE COURT: Well, let me digress just a minute and talk to you about a possible way of dealing with these things. Why couldn’t the defendants, including, I guess, your clients and maybe the clients of the other lawyers at the table, file certified copies of this court’s order, orders, and the Tenth Circuit’s orders and get those things resolved summarily, without much expenditure? Is it just a matter of docket management, where the Court can’t get to things before Ms. Sieverding files her welter of motions we know she does.
MR. BEALL: I believe the answer is, Your Honor, we have attempted to do that. In the situation of the complaints filed by Mrs. Sieverding in Chicago, we advised the court clerk’s office there of both Your Honor’s order and the Tenth Circuit order, and the clerk’s office in the District of Northern Illinois didn’t allow the case to proceed.
We did the same with the clerk’s office in the D.C.District Court, and the court clerk’s office there allowed the case to proceed. We then filed a motion to dismiss both on personal jurisdiction grounds, but also advising the Court there of Your Honor’s order and the Tenth Circuit’s affirmance of your order.
That’s the motion to dismiss that remains pending. There has been no ruling on that.
Certainly Your Honor’s suggestion that one mechanism for dealing with these lawsuits, at least less expensively than engaging in motions practice, would be to advise each new court of Your Honor’s order and the Tenth Circuit’s order, is a mechanism that we have attempted to use in the past, sometimes successfully, sometimes not.
I think going forward, if the Court were to enter the relief that we’ve requested in this latest motion, we would then be able to advise each new court that receives a complaint from Mrs. Sieverding, to the extent that that complaint has not either been approved by this court or is filed by an attorney, would be summarily — would be able to summarily dismiss.
THE COURT: Right. It seems to me that the Northern District of Illinois took the approach that is typically takenif somebody does things like this, which is to refuse the filing because it’s filed in violation of another federal district court’s order.
MR. BEALL: Co-equal court, Your Honor, yes.
THE COURT: And I’m mystified as to why the District of Columbia clerk doesn’t seem to be following that. Mr. Brougham, do you have information on that?
MR. BROUGHAM: Yes, Your Honor. When the Washington, District of Columbia, cases were filed, I contacted the clerk’s office there and asked if they had pro se screening for the very purpose you’re talking about. And they do, but it only applies — as I understand it, the screening is — takes place in the District of Columbia if there is an in forma pauperis filed. Otherwise, they let it go like a normal lawsuit.
THE COURT: If they pay the filing fee, in words, it doesn’t go through the screening process? common. That’s the way we handle it in this court.
MR. BROUGHAM: That’s what happened in the District of Columbia.
The Northern District of Illinois has a more efficient way, I guess. But, anyway, the District of Columbia is allowing this case to proceed as any other one, there is a pending motion to dismiss.
THE COURT: I diverted you from your answer, counsel. You were talking about whether Mr. David Sieverding has complied with his promise to this court in September.
MR. BEALL: We are unaware of whether Mr. Sieverding — Mr. Sieverding has filed a notice of withdrawal in either of the two other D.C. cases. There is a third D.C. case we were unaware of, because it was filed after the September 2 hearing. Mr. Sieverding is listed as a plaintiff in both of those two other D.C. cases. There is nothing in the docket that shows a withdrawal. I understand based on communications from Mr. O’Malley this week that Mr. Sieverding has this week submitted withdrawals from all pending litigation.
THE COURT: I’m mystified as to why you can’t answer my question more directly. The District of Columbia is on electronic filing. All you have to do is go to Pacer and see whether he’s filed a withdrawal of these things.
MR. BEALL: The Pacer docket reflects that he has not, in connection with 05-cv-1672 and 05-cv-2122.
Your Honor, I have copies of the docket reports that I printed out yesterday. I’d be happy to tender them to the Court.
But unfortunately, they are long.
THE COURT: As typically — I’m not suggesting that you tender them.
Well, Mr. O’Malley, what’s going on?
MR. O’MALLEY: I did talk to him, and I believe yesterday was the last withdrawal from one of the D.C. cases. That is my impression, that he has, indeed, got himself disconnected from Mrs. Sieverding —
THE COURT: I’m not interested in your impression. I want to know whether he’s withdrawn those cases.
MR. O’MALLEY: The only thing I can represent to the
Court, Your Honor, is that he has told me that yesterday was the last case that he had withdrawn. And he’s represented to me–
THE COURT: Get the documentation from him. He’s sitting right there.
MR. O’MALLEY: We do not at this point, Your Honor, have the documentation.
THE COURT: Why not?
MR. O’MALLEY: Because late yesterday afternoon was the time we finally made an agreement as to the scope of the representation for me to represent him. And I’ve talked to him over the last week, but it was just yesterday afternoon that we made an agreement that I was going to appear here and try to get him out of this mess. And I told him to make sure that he had filed on the Pacer system withdrawals from every single one of the issues, begin to pull him apart from what his wife was doing.
All I can say is he’s told me that yesterday he did do — went onto Pacer and withdrew from the last cases. I believe it was one case that he had to withdraw from. And that’s — I haven’t been able to confirm it by doing anything, because of the time frame.
THE COURT: Does he have electronic filing rights in the District of Columbia?
MR. BEALL: Your Honor, if I may.
No. Judge Urbina —
THE COURT: Right, they don’t allow pro se filers to file electronically. So it will take some time to process.
But I’m mystified that you would come to court this morning defending a possible contempt citation and not have the documentation.
MR. O’MALLEY: I didn’t have the time, Your Honor. I still had to show up.
THE COURT: Well, it’s better if you show up with evidence.
MR. O’MALLEY: I agree.
THE COURT: Well, you can prove that in short order, when — somewhere he’s got to have that material. So you file it by 5 o’clock this afternoon, or he’ll be in here again.
MR. O’MALLEY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You file it with this court, 5 o’clock this afternoon, the written notice of withdrawal from all of these lawsuits.
MR. O’MALLEY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Everywhere. MR. O’MALLEY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So that answers the first question the Court had.
MR. BEALL: Sure. Your Honor, the motion before the Court is a motion for further relief. The motion asks for relief on the basis of a District of Kansas filing. The relief being sought is an order from this court requiring that Mrs. Sieverding not be permitted to file anything anywhere in any court as a pro se party without receiving written permission from this court.
Obviously, that request would involve the Court in review of the papers that Mrs. Sieverding seeks to file around the country. The motion seeks for the Court to review those papers that she seeks to file around the country, to determine whether the paper is based or not based on the same series of transactions described in this case.
THE COURT: I can’t tell from what she files what is based on anything. It’s gibberish. It truly is. And I say that not to insult her, but it’s just gibberish. And I have better things to do with my time than police this woman. She files a dozen papers at a time.
MR. BEALL: We see them also, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Lengthy ones.
MR. BEALL: We can —
THE COURT: Maybe I can give it to the magistrate judge.
MR. BEALL: Or special master, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, it would be a special master that you all pay for.
MR. BEALL: I understand.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BEALL: The — THE COURT: What’s the story about the District of
Kansas? This appears from the case number to be Judge Lundstrom’s case.
MR. BEALL: The case has not yet been served on the defendants, and that’s the result of the — as a result, the defendants haven’t appeared.
THE COURT: What on earth is wrong with the District of Kansas that they — why can’t you present this kind of an order to the District of Kansas and tell the — ask the clerk to do the same thing that Northern Illinois did, which was, not file a lawsuit?
MR. BEALL: We can. We did, and we have yet to receive a response. The answer, Your Honor, has been, we’re not yet in the case because we haven’t been served. And the Court will not take steps until we’ve been served, which is different — admittedly, it is different from what Chicago did. Chicago didn’t wait for us to be served.
THE COURT: MR. BEALL: THE COURT:
It defeats the very purpose — I agree.– of what we’re trying to do here, which is to prevent this abusive litigant from causing parties to incur multiple expenses defending and appearing in frivolous lawsuits.
MR. BEALL: We concur, Your Honor.
To the extent that the Court feels that it cannot, should not — that it would be a waste of its resources and taxpayers’ money to engage in a review of all paper submitted by Mrs. Sieverding, a lesser remedy that the Court may consider is to issue an order today again ratifying the prohibition restriction on Mrs. Sieverding’s pro se filing. And we can take that order to any other court and take both orders and see whether —
THE COURT: I already did, on March 19, 2004.
MR. BEALL: I agree. I don’t know why that’s not sufficient.
THE COURT: So — I mean, I don’t think I brought that part of this file, because I’m not strong enough to carry the whole file. But —
MR. BEALL: The relevant portion of the order is in page 2 of the order, and prohibits Mrs. Sieverding from filing any — both — it prohibits all plaintiffs from filing any litigation anywhere without an attorney, where the litigation is, quote, based on a series of transactions described in this case.
THE COURT: Maybe the problem is, they have to determine what is based on the — what the transactions in this case are.
MR. BEALL: Your Honor, that was the issue that caused the — at least the magistrate in the District of Minnesota toconduct a hearing, to determine whether the new case filed against the newspaper defendants and our firm was based on the same transactions.
THE COURT: Don’t you think that the record in this case supports the proposition that she is an abusive litigant and therefore should be enjoined from filing any further lawsuits without an attorney, whatever they’re based on?
MR. BEALL: Yes, I believe the record amply demonstrates that there are numerous cases around the country in which courts have entered such orders when a litigant has abused —
THE COURT: I’ve done it. The leading case is Clovis Green’s case.
MR. BEALL: That’s right.
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Sieverding.
MS. SIEVERDING: Respectfully, sir, I would like to know why you think that the case — the 02-cv-1590 case was frivolous, because the only thing that I heard was that since I had filed the various complaints that I didn’t serve and had dismissed under Rule 41 — which, you know, the Supreme Court in [ Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 US 497 – Supreme Court 2001] said that doesn’t cause preclusion. That was the only reason that, for instance, at this [Sept 02, 2010] hearing where I was thrown in jail that Tracy Van Pelt cited. And I talked to Mr. O’Malley about it for an hour or so, and he didn’t seem to find — he was talking about the expense oftaking witnesses or how much with a jury. He didn’t seem to find a flaw.
And so I’m wondering, since the defendants never disputed my facts in an organized way through the rules ofcivil procedure, they only filed these motions, but they didn’t file a reply, since they didn’t provide any evidence or any affidavits, and since I alleged malicious prosecution, and they have no proof that I committed a crime and the case was dismissed, then they had a conspiracy to defame my reputation, since Mr. Bennett threatened to shoot the guy who wanted to buy my lot, so I had to sell it for less money, since they barricaded the road in front of my house for ten years and they converted it, then they built in violation of the zoning, and that devalued my property, and then when I complained, I was defamed on the internet, I was defamed in the newspaper, and I was subject to malicious prosecution, I’m just wondering why you think that it was frivolous.
The magistrate’s record said that I had several pages of hornbook claims against Jane and Kevin Bennett, that he didn’t want to bother to say what they were.
And Mr. Brougham says that all of the government officials have immunity, but the Supreme Court says that if you want to plead immunity, you have to do it with formal reply,with details, where you talk about, you know, did they do this on purpose or that on purpose. It has to be a numbered reply.
And I also heard that attorneys have immunity, but I live in Wisconsin, and Wisconsin Supreme Court there ruled in Walter Stern that attorneys don’t have immunity for intentional tort, and they ruled in Meter that they don’t have immunity for conspiracy with their clients.
And then there was another case, Badger Cab, that said something similar. I would really appreciate after all I’ve been through, if you would tell me why you think my case is frivolous.
THE COURT: Ms. Sieverding, once you lose in a court, you can’t go back and litigate the same issues over and over. You have lost in every court that you’ve been in.
MS. SIEVERDING: Well — THE COURT: Now, you asked me, so you let me answer. MS. SIEVERDING: I’m sorry. I’m very sorry. THE COURT: You lost in the state court in Steamboat Springs. The magistrate judge in this case issued a 60-page recommendation, carefully explaining to you why your position was frivolous. This court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation as the order of this court, 60 pages worth of explanation to you.
You appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. You lost again. The Tenth Circuit affirmed not only what the magistrate judge had said, what this court did based on the magistrate judge’s ruling, but also clearly suggested that this court could prohibit you from filing further lawsuits
You went to the United States Supreme Court to seek further review. You lost. Now, it may be hard for you to accept the fact that you’ve lost at every level, but you have. And you cannot go back and do it over and over again, as you are trying to do.
And the reason you can’t do that is you are inflicting damage, economic damage on people that shouldn’t have that damage inflicted on them. That is to say, they have won, they have prevailed. And yet you go on all over the country, not only in this district, where the events occurred, but in Minnesota, Illinois, the District of Columbia, and Kansas, and file the same lawsuit over and over and over again, and they have to defend that. And they hire lawyers to defend that. And those lawyers cost them money. And that, you are not entitled to do.
The issue is not your access to court. There is no doubt that a citizen has the right to petition the courts underthe United States Constitution, but that right is limited. You cannot file frivolous lawsuits and then invoke your right to access to the court. Every court that has heard your case has determined that you lose. And in this court, your lawsuits have been determined to be frivolous.
I’m sorry you cannot accept that, but that is a fact.
And you are not going to relitigate these things over and over again to the detriment of these other people.
Now, sit down.
You prepare the order. Your motion is granted. MR. BEALL: Thank you. THE COURT: The order should reflect that
Ms. Sieverding is prohibited from filing any further lawsuits anywhere in this country unless she is represented by a lawyer or unless this court specifically approves her filing of a given lawsuit.
Ms. Sieverding, I’ve heard from you. I’ve told you why you’re wrong. Do you want to dismiss these lawsuits? Yes or no, will you dismiss these lawsuits?
MS. SIEVERDING: If I dismiss them, will you let me out of jail today?
THE COURT: Yes. If you will promise me to dismiss them within the next 11 days, I will let you out of jail today.
MS. SIEVERDING: All right. I’ll do it. THE COURT: Court’s in recess. (Hearing concluded at 10:01 a.m.)”
******************
As you can see, Judge Nottingham refused to state why he dismissed my case. All the other courts that dismissed my case did so on the basis of “res judicata” which is supposed to require an actual trial, which I never got, or on the basis that I was not allowed to represent myself because Judge Nottingham said so.
I was NOT accused of a crime, there was no bail hearing, there was no warrant that complied with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the procedure that was used was not published in The Federal Register.
There is a problem with this law that was signed by President George Washington and has been in the U.S. Judiciary Act since 1794
“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 USC § 1654 – APPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BY COUNSEL
since the “rules of such courts” are supposed to be published, but what the hell…. don’t courts have inherent authority to ignore the Rules Enabling Act?

How did this happen?:

The magistrate held an oral hearing and this is what was said:

****************************

Magistrate Schlatter: “lawyers represented parties who were opposed…their sole and exclusive duty ….was to “do adverse things to you”…if they had helped you, they would be violating their duty to their client and they would be in trouble.” (d81, p. 41)
Kay Sieverding: “I can prove the perjured testimony and I gave the proof of the perjured testimony to …KLAUZER..and he didn’t remedy it”.
Magistrate “(Lawyers) can’t be sued by the parties that are hurt on the other side of the lawsuit because it was their job to hurt that party. That’s what they are supposed to do” (D81 p. 46).
Kay Sieverding “so you’re saying that they can do anything in a courtroom to hurt you and that it’s legal?”
Magistrate Schlatter “That’s as good as absolute immunity. It means that you can’t collect anything…Immunity means immunity” (D81, p.69)
Kay Sieverding “Do you think that if an attorney knowingly lies in court to hurt you and succeeds, that they should be liable for that?” (D81, p.70)
Magistrate Schlatter: No (D81, p. 71)
Kay Sieverding: “Do you think that if an attorney lies outside of court and knowingly hurts you that they should be liable for that?”
Magistrate Schlatter: “….you’re just making up things…Even if the lawyer gives a false statement of the law or a false statement of the facts, I would have to sit here and look at you and say no claim” (D81, p. 71)
Kay Sieverding: “if a lawyer tells a client that they can break the law, you don’t think that the lawyer should be liable to the person that’s hurt by them breaking the law?” (D81, p. 72)
Magistrate Schlatter: …”frivolous…you…are going to pay the consequences”
Magistrate Schlatter: “…I look up these recognized causes of action…and I compared the facts to my case…now it seems that you’re telling me that these recognized causes of action aren’t valid. And that leaves me in ..a quandary as to what I should do.” (D81, p. 76)
Magistrate Schlatter: “your remedies are of the state court…” (D81, p.76)
Kay Sieverding: “I can’t go to district court in Steamboat and get a fair trial”
Magistrate Schlatter: “That’s not my problem” (D81, 76)
Kay Sieverding: “I don’t live in Steamboat. It’s not fair…I’m in federal court because I believe I have…constitutional issues…a right under diversity (as current WI resident)…damages of more than $75,000…I’m an American citizen and a taxpayer…I have a right to have the court review my case”. (D81, p.77)
Magistrate Schlatter: “…I can’t stop you…I’m not going to talk about nonfeasance and misfeasance and whatnot. Those words…are foreign to the court…they are not even words that I’ve ever seen used (p.77)…what you should file is a motion to voluntarily dismiss…if you don’t, you know what’s coming” (D81, p.78)
Kay Sieverding: “Nonfeasance is in my law dictionary….there were…11 cases recently in the 10th Circuit and 8 cases in the 7th Circuit” (D81, p. 78).
Magostrate Schlatter: “consequences…are going to befall you… …lesson..from the bench and from the other lawyers in the case…I did it for myself…a burden to (defendants)…you’ve sued frivolously…this hearing is over” (D81, p. 79).
OLDER SON: “We’ve suffered real damages and losses. They did a lot of wrong stuff to us. And you’re saying that, well, they’re going to get away with it because they get immunity or something like that. It’s not right” (D81, p. 79)
Magistrate Sclatter: “We only listen to special cases, this may not be one of them” (D81, p. 80).
Magistrate Schlatter: “if they …suborn perjury…you still do not have a private right of action against them for that”
Kay Sieverding: “What if they libel you…What if they defame your reputation? What if they lie about you knowingly?”
Magistrate Schlatter: “the likelihood that any liability would attach to anyone who is in an official court proceeding making remarks is virtually none…the lawyers would have qualified immunity” (D81 p. 48.)
*******************************
So I guess I should have listened to Magistrate Schlatter and known that I would be ruined if I sued a lawyer.
Magistrate Schlatter issued this order for that oral hearing:
******************************
“David Brougham has advised me that in the event that plaintiffs obtain service upon any of the municipal defendants he will be the attorney for such defendants. In light of that fact, I will direct that Mr. Brougham also attend the status conference” p. 7 “order setting status conference 1/10/03 Magistrate Schlatter” Colorado 02- 1950 document 9
********************************
Anthony Lettunich sent this bill to the City of Steamboat Springs:
****************************
On 2/12/03,“Review new letter from Sieverding to Tremaine regarding Jane Bennett and many city defendants. Telephone call to Dave Brougham—discussed pleadings from Wisconsin court and Sieverding letter. Conference call to Magistrate Schlatter. Further discussion with Brougham on notice letter to Sieverding.”
*********************************
A verified bill from the city attorney Lettunich says:
*************************
“Telephone call from Dave Brougham (defense attorney for government defendants) advising me that the Clerk for Magistrate Schlatter advised that no Reply would be necessary”. 6/24/03
**************************
Other verified attorney bills show:
************************
7/02/03 “Telephone call from clerk regarding certain motions”
7/30/03 “Telephone call to Court regarding latest filings”.
8/04/03 “Telephone call to court regarding filings by plaintiffs”
8/15/03 “Confer with court regarding status of pending motions and timing of ruling”
9/8/03 “Telephone call to court regarding status of pending motions”
9/09/03 “Confer with court regarding status of motions”
9/24/03 “Confer with court regarding status of pending motions”
10/14/03 “Confer with court clerk regarding filing of recommendation regarding pending motions”
12/11/03 “Review actual court file” “confer with clerks regarding case status, pending motions” “Further conference with court staff regarding motion status”
1/07/04 “Confer with court regarding status of plaintiff pleadings, pending motions, etc. Analyze motion to enjoin grounds, etc.”
2/11/04 “”Telephone call to court regarding Plaintiff’s latest filings.”
*************************
These itemized bills don’t show any troubles understanding my so-called “gibberish”.
It seems clear that my case in the District of Colorado was “fixed” and that the attorney fee shifting bills, the orders against self representation, and the repeated jailings without a criminal charge were part of witness intimidation, witness retaliation, obstruction of justice, and a cover up of the previous.
What do you think? Is it possible for me to fix my life or am I totally screwed because I argued that lawyers could be sued or because I sued the ABA or because I resisted the order that I couldn’t represent myself.
When I sued the ABA I argued that their website discouraged lawyers from suing lawyers and therefore that lawyers can do anything they want with impunity. I based that on 42 USC § 1985(1) “ All people have the same right to sue as white people” and I argued that I should have the same right to sue as white people who aren’t suing lawyers and therefore I should be able to hire a lawyer to sue a lawyer. I guess the ABA was worried that other people might sue them or that lawyers would start suing other lawyers in tort not just based on contract violation. Is that so controversial that I should be tormented forever? I don’t even think that the ABA web site says that anymore so they probably don’t need to be worried about people suing them for that.
What do you think?

This is the federal statute for witness intimidation:
***************

18 USC § 1512 – TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT
(a)
(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, with intent to—
(A) prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(B) prevent the production of a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(C) prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).
(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to—
(A) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(B) cause or induce any person to—
(i) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;
(ii) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding;
(iii) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(iv) be absent from an official proceeding to which that person has been summoned by legal process; or
(C) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).
(3) The punishment for an offense under this subsection is—
(A) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112;
(B) in the case of—
(i) an attempt to murder; or
(ii) the use or attempted use of physical force against any person;
imprisonment for not more than 30 years; and
(C) in the case of the threat of use of physical force against any person, imprisonment for not more than 20 years.
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to—
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(2) cause or induce any person to—
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding;
(C) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been summoned by legal process; or
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation [1] supervised release,, [1] parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from—
(1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding;
(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation [1] supervised release,, [1] parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
(3) arresting or seeking the arrest of another person in connection with a Federal offense; or
(4) causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such prosecution or proceeding;
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.
(e) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, it is an affirmative defense, as to which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant’s sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully.
(f) For the purposes of this section—
(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense; and
(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be admissible in evidence or free of a claim of privilege.
(g) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance—
(1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, magistrate judge, grand jury, or government agency is before a judge or court of the United States, a United States magistrate judge, a bankruptcy judge, a Federal grand jury, or a Federal Government agency; or
(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an adviser or consultant.
(h) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.
(i) A prosecution under this section or section 1503 may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or about to be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.
(j) If the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.
(k) Whoever conspires to commit any offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
Here is the transcript of a court appearance on Feb 14, 2006 before Judge Edward Nottingham. Do you think this qualifies as witness intimidation?
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 02CV1950-EWN KAY SIEVERDING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs. COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants. _______________________________________________________________
REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT COMPLIANCE HEARING
_______________________________________________________________
Proceedings before the HONORABLE EDWARD W. NOTTINGHAM, Judge, United States District Court for theDistrict of Colorado, commencing at 8:31 a.m., on the 14th day of February, 2006, in Courtroom A1001, United States Courthouse, Denver, Colorado.
For the Plaintiffs For the Defendants
APPEARANCES
KAY SIEVERDING Pro Se THOMAS KELLEY, ESQ. Faegre & Benson
370 17th Street Denver, Colorado TRACI VAN PELT, ESQ. McConnell Siderius Fleischner
2401 15th Street Denver, Colorado
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 02CV1950-EWN KAY SIEVERDING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs. COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.

_______________________________________________________________
REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT COMPLIANCE HEARING
_______________________________________________________________
Proceedings before the HONORABLE EDWARD W. NOTTINGHAM, Judge, United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, commencing at 8:31 a.m., on the 14th day of February, 2006, in Courtroom A1001, United States Courthouse, Denver, Colorado.
For the Plaintiffs For the Defendants
APPEARANCES
KAY SIEVERDING Pro Se
THOMAS KELLEY, ESQ. Faegre & Benson
370 17th Street Denver, Colorado
TRACI VAN PELT, ESQ. McConnell Siderius Fleischner 2401 15th Street Denver, Colorado
NDREW RINGEL, ESQ. Hall & Evans 1125 17th Street Denver, Colorado
BRETT HUFF, ESQ. White & Steele 950 17th Street Denver, Colorado
THERESE LINDBLOM, Official Reporter 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado 80294
Proceedings Reported by Mechanical Stenography Transcription Produced via Computer
PROCEEDINGS THE COURT: Case 02-cv-1950, Kay Sieverding v. The
Colorado Bar Association and others. Ms. Sieverding appears this morning on bond, and I’ll
take the appearances of everyone else.

MR. KELLEY: Your Honor, I’m Tom Kelley of Faegre &Benson for Worldwest LLC and Suzanne Schlicht.

MR. RINGEL: Good morning, Your Honor. Andrew Ringel from Hall & Evans on behalf of the City of Steamboat Springs defendants.

MR. HUFF: Brett Huff on behalf of the Colorado Bar Association.

MS. VAN PELT: Good morning, Your Honor. Traci Van Pelt behalf of Jan Bennett, Klauzer & Tremaine, Rich Tremaine, Randall Klauzer, James Horner and Jane Bennett.

THE COURT: All right. This matter is before the Court on several pending motions.
Have the defendants received a copy of Document 800, which is a motion to cancel the scheduled hearing?

MR. RINGEL: Yes, I believe it was served on us on ECF, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court investigated on its own the dismissal of the other lawsuits, because both the District of Kansas and District of Columbia have electronic filing. Ms. Sieverding, I think there are two cases in the District of Columbia that have not been dismissed, and they have no record of your having filed motions in those cases.
It appears in Kansas that you did file a motion to dismiss. And in one of the District of Columbia cases, you did file a motion to dismiss, evidently. But the other two have not been dismissed.
Do you wish to speak to that?

MS. SIEVERDING: Yes. What I did is I wrote up a motion, and I used on the top a caption with the different case numbers, which the docketing clerk — her name is Patricia, who works here — says that is acceptable way of doing things.

THE COURT: Well, you didn’t get the job done. It’s not docketed that way in the District of Columbia, and it’s your obligation to follow that up.

MS. SIEVERDING: Well –

THE COURT: You know, my docket — Ms. Pirner, you’re referring to, is my docket clerk. And what happens here is not what happens in the District of Columbia, evidently. And your obligation was to get these cases dismissed a long time before today.

MS. SIEVERDING: What happened in the District of Columbia is that on a couple of different times I filed things where I put — like I filed one thing, and I put different case numbers on it, and they docketed them in the different cases. Well, then in December, the attorneys representing the
02-cv-1950 put in a motion to stay that, which the judge there granted. And the case is stayed. And so what happened was that I didn’t know it was stayed, because I was in jail, and I didn’t get the order. And my husband was told that he would be jailed if he [sent] me documents, so I didn’t know it was stayed.

And so when I was in jail, I sent a couple more things out by express mail to the District of Columbia that had more than one case number on them. And they — what happened was that in the third case, they denied the — the clerk deniedpermission to file, and then in the other two cases they just didn’t show up at all. And so when I filed this most recent thing in the District of Columbia, which is all under the same judge there, it had the different case numbers on it, and they didn’t docket it. And I guess that the way that they do it there is that they — that when it’s stayed, they don’t docket. I can’t control how they do things.

THE COURT: That’s just not true. I talked to the Clerk of the Court of the United States District Court for the 20 District of Columbia. And the staying of a case did not prevent docketing in a case, any more than it prevents docketing in a case in this court. If a case is stayed, things still get docketed on it. That is a nonsensical explanation.

MS. SIEVERDING: Well

THE COURT: You know, you need to follow up on this stuff, and you needed to do it a long time before today, Ms. Sieverding. Your husband is — has purged himself of contempt, because he finally got the message. You stand here today; you still haven’t gotten the message.

MS. SIEVERDING: You download what was filed in 02122, it has the other case numbers on it.

THE COURT: Okay. You may be seated. All right. What do the defendants want? MS. VAN PELT: Your Honor, if I may, on behalf of the lawyer defendants and Jane Bennett, I would note what she filed is a dismissal without prejudice. And her pleading indicates she intends to reassert claims. And the captions don’t include some of the defendants in these cases, including my law firm and the law firms of the other lawyers defending people in this case.
So my position is, she has not purged her contempt. And a filing of — even an ineffective dismissal without prejudice does not comply with your order.

THE COURT: So you’re saying in the District of Kansasshe dismissed the case against the newspaper defendants, but not against your clients? Were you ever sued in the District of Kansas?

MS. VAN PELT: Not in the District of Kansas. My clients were sued in all of the District of Columbia cases, and me personally and my law firm were sued in the District of
Columbia cases and served, as well as all of the lawyers – law firms sitting at this table here today were served. And we also entered appearances in that case and hired lawyers to just get that case dismissed.

She — the District of Columbia cases in which she has named my clients and my firm were dismissed without prejudice, from at least what I saw that she filed. And the captions don’t include the proper parties, because they don’t include, for example, my law firm, White & Steele, Faegre & Benson, the 10 other firms that have been sued.

THE COURT: Well, there are two separate problems that you address. One is that it’s an incomplete caption; therefore, leaves some of the parties in limbo. And the second problem is that it’s dismissal without prejudice. And I understand how theoretically you could have a
problem with that; but assuming that the — that you are successful in upholding the January 4 contempt case in front of the Circuit, that seems to me to be a detail that I’m not concerned about. Because if it’s dismissed, it’s dismissed. You no longer have to defend it. It’s without prejudice, and therefore I suppose could theoretically be reasserted. But if the new filing sanctions are upheld — and I hope they will be, because it seems to me, that gets us to the point that any new lawsuits would have to be approved by this court, that is, the filing of any new lawsuits.

So why are — why are you insisting on dismissal — on the fact that this needs to be a dismissal with prejudice?

MS. VAN PELT: I get the point that you’re making, Your Honor — I guess my only concern is, having litigated with Mrs. Sieverding for four years, as well as this court, that she doesn’t get the message that the dismissal without prejudice doesn’t mean she could refile these cases again.

THE COURT: Well, she might try, but she would have to present something to this court. And the whole idea of the additional restrictions that were imposed in the January 4 order, which was, I guess, formalized, one might say, on January 31, was to allow any person defending a case in the new lawsuit where she doesn’t get the approval of this court, to file this order and ask that the case be dismissed in that court.

MS. VAN PELT: That’s fine with us, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. What do the other defendants think? Mr. Kelley.

MR. KELLEY: Your Honor, for my clients and my lawfirm, all we want is a complete withdrawal, and that’s just a ceasefire, the documents that will achieve a dismissal with or without prejudice for all of the defendants, and it just apparently hasn’t happened yet.

MR. RINGEL: And I would join Mr. Kelley’s comments.

THE COURT: Here is the question: You know, I think Ms. Sieverding is still in contempt. I’ve checked with the District of Columbia clerks. Two cases have not been dismissed — have not been dismissed at all, with or without prejudice You’ve pointed out that the other dismissals in the District of Columbia are incomplete, in that they do not dismiss the — all of the parties.

You know, I’m wondering as a practical matter if the cases are dismissed in their entirety, the fact that the caption doesn’t name all of the parties might not be material. But the question that I started to ask was, are the defendants suggesting that the plaintiff be jailed until she purges herself of contempt, or are they suggesting that I giveher an additional period of time to accomplish this dismissal?

MS. VAN PELT: Your Honor, on behalf of my clients, I think under the circumstances, with Mrs. Sieverding having made at least some effort to dismiss them, additional time would be acceptable, but not an inordinate amount of time. This has been going on for quite a while.

THE COURT: I’m also disturbed with the fact that I gave her plenty of time after January 4. And certainly her husband got the message and got the job done. And I’m satisfied with Mr. Sieverding’s compliance with the orders, but belatedly. It does appear to me that she’s getting the message slowly, painfully.Mr. Kelley.

MR. KELLEY: I agree with Ms. Van Pelt’s position.

MR. RINGEL: I suggest seven days, Your Honor.

MR. HUFF: Judge, I agree with all the other defense counsel. I believe seven days is probably an adequate amount of time for her to comply with the Court’s order.

THE COURT: All right.

Ms. Sieverding, you’ve heard the discussion here. And what you have got to do is file separate motions. I think — you know, I don’t think that this joint caption that you filed here gets the job done. In your filing with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, motion for stay of contempt sanctions and hearing before Judge Nottingham, you attached a consolidated motion to withdraw without prejudice under duress of jail. Do you remember that?

MS. SIEVERDING: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: You have to answer yes or no, okay.

MS. SIEVERDING: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And that’s a very confusing caption, because you include the Kansas case and all of the District of Columbia cases in one pleading. And contrary to what my docket clerk told you, it’s a violation of the rule to file joint pleadings in cases that haven’t been consolidated, for example, the District of Kansas and the District of Columbia cases.

So what I think you need to do is take each case the way you filed it — okay.

MS. SIEVERDING: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: — with all of the defendants named and dismiss the case.
I think it should be a dismissal with prejudice, but I — we’ve heard the defendants say it’s acceptable to be a dismissal without prejudice at this point, and we’ll see what the Tenth Circuit does with the additional restrictions that were imposed on January 4.

You have seven days to do that and to furnish to this court proof that you’ve done it and serve that proof on thedefendants. Do you understand that?

MS. SIEVERDING: What would be an acceptable proof?

THE COURT: A copy of what you file. And I will check it out, because I now have access to the database in Kansas and the District of Columbia. And I will check out and make sure that you have dismissed all of those cases.

MS. SIEVERDING: But what if they don’t docket it?
Because that’s what happened before.

THE COURT: Well, they’ll docket it. That’s not the question. You can’t — you can’t weasel out of it that way. You send it to them just the way you’ve done it and ask them to file it. They’ll file it.

MS. SIEVERDING: All right. So if I — I just write the thing out and have separate captions and send it in and have proof of delivery and then check the docket –

THE COURT: You check the docket and make sure it gets dismissed, and I will too. But that’s your obligation. If they’re misfiling it, you need to be in communication with the clerk of the court and saying, I want to dismiss all of these cases. How do you get that done? And I think the way you get it done is you file — you file these separately so that nobody’s confused about whether they need to be filed in all the cases.

All right.

MS. SIEVERDING: I — THE COURT: So this hearing — I’m not doing anything but continuing this hearing. I’m not releasing you from any obligation. I’m not taking back any findings of contempt, Ms. Sieverding, because as far as I’m concerned at this moment you are still in contempt of court.

This matter will be set for a further hearing at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, the 22nd of February. And that means you have to show up in court unless the hearing is vacated. And I will entertain a motion to vacate the hearing upon proof that you’ve complied.

And that, in effect, gives you through next Tuesday to get the job done, which is a week from today.

Any questions?

MS. SIEVERDING: Could I have a few more days? Because by the time I get home tonight, I won’t be able to — I won’t get home until midnight. And so then if I send it off on Wednesday, and they got it on Thursday –

THE COURT: I’ll tell you what — MS. SIEVERDING: Because I don’t have ECF, and so they
have to scan them.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. SIEVERDING: So they’re — so it’s hard to do in that period of time.

THE COURT: Well, I suggest you use express mail or some form of expedited delivery.

MS. SIEVERDING: Well, I have. But in the past when I filed there, the scanning has taken — like the last time that filed there, they didn’t scan it the day they got it, you know what I’m saying. And when I file here, I don’t have ECF either, so there is a delay again.

THE COURT: But I’ll be told here.

MS. SIEVERDING: You don’t think I could have a few more days?

THE COURT: I’ll give you one more — and the other thing that we need to be concerned about on the seven-day suggestion is, Monday is a court holiday. I’ll continue this hearing on the contempt until Monday, the 27th of February at 9:00 a.m. And I will vacate that — you have to show up, Ms. Sieverding, unless the hearing is vacated. And I’ll vacate the hearing if I’m satisfied that you have dismissed all of these cases.

MS. SIEVERDING: So in order to stay out of jail, what I need to do is to file separate motions to dismiss without prejudice and make sure that all of — that everybody that was served is listed on the caption?

THE COURT: Right. I think that’s right. And then you need to follow up — you need to call the clerk in the District of Columbia.

So you need to get on this right away, because if you wait until the last minute, you may have difficulty. But you need to get on it when you get home, send the documents in. You call the clerk of the court, and you tell the clerk of the court that I suggested that you call and find out how to get all of those cases dismissed and then follow up and make sure they are dismissed.

MS. SIEVERDING: Well, when I called the clerk before, it was like a voice mail, and then she never called back. And –

THE COURT: All right. You know, I’m not going to work through this with you. You figure out how to get it done. You managed to file lawsuits all over the country, and I — I think that you can get them dismissed, if you really want to do it. Okay.

So you’ll stay out of jail if all of these cases are 2 dismissed in time for me to vacate the hearing. Otherwise, the next time you show up, you pack your toothbrush, because you’re going to jail.

MS. SIEVERDING: So what you’re saying is that if I file a motion to dismiss and Judge Urbina or the judge in Kansas won’t dismiss it, that you’re going to put me in jail –

THE COURT: No. All you have to do is file.

MS. SIEVERDING: All I have to do is file.

THE COURT: You get it filed.

MS. SIEVERDING: And have it on the docket.

THE COURT: And have it on the docket. I’m not going to penalize you because there is some delay in the judge acting on the motion.

MS. SIEVERDING: And if they don’t put it on the docket, what I can do is document the efforts that I –

THE COURT: No, just make sure it gets on the docket. You can call them and make sure it gets on the docket. You know, you’re just trying to nitpick this; and I’m not going to let you do it. You make sure it gets dismissed.

It’s your obligation. You somehow got them filed; you get them dismissed.
Okay.

You get the job done. You’ve got — you know, first of all, you had from January 4 through today’s date to get the job done already, and now I’m giving you more time to get the job done. If you want to do it, you can get the job done.

Your husband did it. Ask him how he did it. This is not rocket science.
That’s it. Do you understand what I’m saying?

MS. SIEVERDING: I think so.

THE COURT: All right. Court’s in recess. (Hearing concluded at 8:55 a.m.)

*******************************************

So what do you think?

Was what happened to me legal or criminal?

Do you know why my case was dismissed?

Do you know why I was ordered to pay $100,000 +?

Do you know the statutory authority under which I was imprisoned?

When I was imprisoned the United States Marshals Service used the Prisoner Population Management / Prisoner Tracking System to keep track of me because that’s how the USMS knows which prisoners are where.

DOJ published in the Federal Register on November 8, 1999 in Vol. 64, No. 215 page 60836 a “Revised Notice regarding its Prisoner Tracking System” and in that the government stated that the “Categories of Records in the System” are “Any and all information necessary to complete administrative processes, safekeeping, health care, and disposition of individual Federal prisoners who are in custody pending criminal proceedings, together with any law enforcement related record generated during such custody.”

At no time did DOJ publish a notice in the Federal Register that the “categories of records to be included in the Prisoner Population Management System/ Prisoner Tracking System include records of Federal prisoners who are in custody pending ‘civil contempt’ proceedings.”

Since I was not in custody “pending criminal proceedings”, I have statutory authorization to sue the Department of Justice for compensation of actual economic damages from a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552a subsection (e)(4)(I), which requires advance notice in the Federal Register of the “categories of records in the system” because there is no record of the government’s intention to include records that were generated in connection with the processing of Federal prisoners who are in custody WITHOUT pending criminal proceedings.

But the Department of Justice says they don’t want me to sue them and they say
“All aspects of the USMS’s investigations and detention of Mrs. Sieverding were lawful.” See DDC Case 1:09-cv-00562-JDB Document 54-1 Filed 03/09/10 Page 1 of 9

What do you think?

If you file a lawsuit and it is dismissed without an opinion and with no finding that you misrepresented any fact or any law, you are ordered to pay $100 K, do you think that the Department of Justice can or should put you in jail to stop you from going to another court?

Do you think that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction or do you think that once your case has been assigned to one judge he has jurisdiction over you and whatever you file in any other court? Remember, the public defender stated that my other cases were “arguably not related”.

My case in the District of Kansas was for defamation in a different time period and it was never determined that the newspaper articles, which are now on the Internet, were totally true and not defamatory. [They contained accurate retellings of fraudulent statements that the publisher of the Steamboat Pilot knew were fraudulent, i.e. that there was probable cause to prosecute me criminally when all that I did was complain that my neighbors violated the zoning, that I harassed and abused Jane Bennett when all that I did was complain that she and her husband fenced off Princeton Ave., kept me from using the street to access my property where I wanted to access it, and violated the zoning by building extra buildings that aren’t even on the property tax rolls, at least not accurately, and that the extra buildings built by Jane and Kevin Bennett did not violate the zoning when they were only allowed to have one building with a sewer connection and they had three buildings with sewer connections, all suitable as residences.]

My case in the District of Columbia specified a different cause of action than my case in the District of Colorado. In the D.C. case I specified that the cause of action was “First Amendment Retaliation” and that the ABA stopped the fair adjudication of the Colorado case by writing to Judge Nottingham and asking him to ignore my motions for summary judgment. In the Colorado case I listed various city ordinances and state laws and said that there was a conspiracy to ignore them and that violated my constitutional rights.

Do you think that the rights of pro se litigants are important to our democracy or do you think that if you can’t afford a lawyer, or can’t get a lawyer who will handle your case against someone in power, that you should be prohibited from filing in federal court or only get one chance and then be stuck with whatever happens even if there is no trial?

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